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PERSPECTIVES ON A POTENTIAL
UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF
CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Prospects for a Free Trade Agreement
Between the United States and the
Republic of China
RONALD A. CASS*
INTRODUCTION

In general, I have little confidence in predictions regarding future
developments in international trade. Having been asked to offer views
on the prospects for a free trade agreement ("FTA") between the
United States and the Republic of China ("ROC"), I should begin by
invoking all the reservations that are normally appropriate for attempts to predict the future. Indeed, extra caution is called for in this
project, as analysis of prospects for a United States-ROC FTA requires considering not only the present and future relationships between the two countries, but also a number of other variables, many
of which are not easily assessed.
The saving grace here, however, is that the most obvious, and
probably most important, influence on the prospects for a United
States-ROC agreement is the relationship between the United States
and the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). Before the United
States can negotiate an FTA with the ROC, it must carefully consider
the likely impact of such negotiations upon its relations with the
PRC. This impact is not hard to predict, and it stands squarely in the
path of any possible FTA.
Before explaining why no such FTA will occur, let me briefly
state the pro-FTA case. From the United States perspective, there are
several advantages. The ROC has much higher average tariff rates
than the United States. This makes the advantages of an FTA for
* Dean, Boston University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts. Mr. Cass was formerly the Vice Chairman of the United States International Trade Commission. Thanks are
due to Stephen Narkin for his generous assistance in the preparation of this article.
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United States exporters much greater relative to other exporters to the
ROC than the FTA's advantage for ROC exporters to the United
States. The opportunity to sell in the ROC is of no small value, given
the ROC's extraordinary levels of savings and foreign exchange
reserves. If the world increasingly divides among trade blocs, the
United States would be advantaged by linking up with an expanded
Asian-Pacific trading area, including the ROC. Such a relationship
would give United States producers access (on terms better than some
important competitors) to a large group of consumers that is expanding rapidly in numbers and wealth. From the ROC perspective,
there would be significant economic and political advantages in
linkage on preferential terms to the world's largest single market.
And there lies the rub.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT

In March 1989, the International Trade Commission ("ITC") issued a report evaluating the reaction to possible FTA negotiations by
the United States with several Pacific Rim countries, including the
ROC.1 The United States Senate Committee on Finance ("Finance
Committee") requested the report just after the ITC had prepared a
similar report for the Committee addressing the pros and cons of negotiating an FTA with Japan. 2 In accordance with the Finance Committee's request, the ITC did not perform an independent assessment,
but rather solicited and summarized the views of government representatives, private industry, and academia on the potential merits of
such negotiations.
In the course of this survey, the PRC, in a letter from its ambassador to the United States, formally advised the ITC that it was
"firmly opposed" to any attempt by the United States to negotiate an
FTA with the ROC. 3 The PRC has taken the position that any such
contacts by United States officials with ROC authorities would violate
"the spirit and principles" of three United States-PRC joint communiques issued since the United States and the PRC resumed formal
1. See The Pros and Cons of Entering into Negotiations on Free Trade Area Agreements with Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, and ASEAN, or the Pacific Rim Region in General: Report to the Senate Committee on Finance, USITC Pub. 2166, Inv. No. TA-332-259
(March 1989) [hereinafter Pacific Rim Study].
2. Pros and Cons of Initiating Negotiations with Japan to Explore the Possibility of a
U.S.-Japan Free Trade Agreement: Report to the Senate Committee on Finance, USITC Pub.
2120, Inv. No. TA-332-255 (Sept. 1988).
3. See Pacific Rim Study, supra note 1, at 1-3.

1990]

Investment and Trade with the Republic of China

83

government-to-government contact in 1972. 4 The ambassador's letter
stated that by these joint communiques the United States agreed to
establish and develop governmental relations only with the PRC.
Further, the ambassador warned that any official contacts with ROC
authorities "on the ground of resolving trade or other issues" would
violate the joint communiques.
Others interviewed during the course of the ITC study expressed
a different view. They opined that an FTA between the United States
and the ROC could be achieved through some mechanism other than
a formal agreement between governments. The existing ROC Coordination Council for North American Affairs ("CCNAA") was frequently mentioned in this context. Those suggesting such an informal
agreement believed it would be dramatically less disconcerting to the
PRC.
While it may be true. that an informal agreement between the
United States and the ROC would encounter fewer legal and political
constraints, I doubt that the exact nature of the arrangement will substantially affect the prospects for a United States-ROC FTA. When
considering whether an FTA is worth pursuing, the United States will
weigh heavily the PRC's reaction to such an agreement, regardless of
its technical structure. Any agreement, however implemented, that
grants the ROC a special status in the United States-a status currently enjoyed by only two other countries-is apt to be disfavored by
the PRC. An FTA which promises both closer economic ties between
the United States and the ROC and a strengthening of the ROC's
economy appears particularly objectionable to the PRC, even if it is
not encapsulated in a document with all of the trappings typical of
government-to-government agreements.
POSSIBLE

PRC OBJECTION TO AN FTA

The real question, then, is just how heavily the PRC's objection
would weigh. It appears that, regardless of the current status of relations between the United States and the PRC, the United States is
4. See Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People's Republic of
China in U.S.

GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE

PRESIDENTS

OF THE

1972 376 (1974); Joint Communique of the Establishment
of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of
China in 2 U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: JIMMY CARTER 1978 2264 (1979); United States-China Joint Communique
on the United StatesArms Sales to Taiwan in 2 U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, PUBLIC PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD REAGAN 1982 1052 (1983).
UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON
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unlikely to risk significant damage to that relationship over an FTA
with the ROC. Certainly, the political events in the PRC during the
summer of 1989 were a significant setback to relations between the
United States and the PRC. United States policy following these
events, however, made it apparent that maintaining good relations
with the PRC is extremely important to the United States. To be
sure, the United States strongly condemned the PRC's reaction to the
demonstrations for democracy, and critics of the Bush administration
complained loudly that the executive branch moved too quickly to
return United States-PRC relations to a "normal" state. Some voices
still call for sanctions of at least symbolic value against the PRC.
Still, if one looks beneath the rhetoric, there has been bipartisan support for the United States government's efforts to preserve the political and economic gains that resulted from the dramatic improvement
in relations between the United States and the PRC over the past two
decades. Accordingly, if the United States perceives any risk that
FTA negotiations with the ROC would further impair its relationship
with the PRC, this risk alone may deter the United States from any
such discussions.
In sum, as long as relations between the United States and the
PRC are good, the United States will not want to create potential new
tensions. Even if relations are strained, the United States will not
want to take action that increases that strain, at a minimum requiring
assurance that such actions promise benefit to the United States sufficiently great to counterbalance the risks attending worsened United
States-PRC relations. For the past twenty years or so, the United
States' treatment of the PRC and the ROC have demonstrated the
former point; governmental pronouncements over the past year and a
half reflect the latter. At present, the United States expresses little
interest in developing an agreement that would bring the United
States closer to the ROC, regardless of the possible benefits. There
are now virtually no discussions by the government indicating a
movement toward an FTA with the ROC at any time in the foreseeable future. Based on correspondence between the PRC government
and the ITC, obtained in the course of our recent FTA study, it appears that United States-PRC relations may, in fact, deteriorate if the
United States enters into an FTA with the ROC.
POSSIBLE CONCERNS OF OTHER NATIONS

Even if diplomatic tensions would not be triggered by discussions
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of an FTA between the United States and the ROC, it is still questionable whether the United States would consider this an opportune time
for such discussions. The United States attaches great importance to
the ongoing Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") negotiations. Based on various public statements
made by administration officials testifying before Congress and in
other forums, it is clear that the GATT talks have become the administration's primary means of achieving greater international protection of intellectual property, elimination of subsidies in agriculture
and steel, adoption of rules respecting trade in services, and progress
on a host of other critical issues.
There is a widespread fear in the United States that other nations
would perceive United States FTA negotiations with other countries-at least with noncontiguous nations, outside of North
America-as an indication that the United States has lost faith in the
GATT process. For this reason alone, FTA negotiations with other
nations, including the ROC, are not likely to occur in the near future. 5 Discussion of other possible FTAs, while not ruled out, is being
confined by administration officials to speculation on alternatives if
the GATT round fails. In this context, it is arguable that the ROC is
a special case and should be treated as such because the ROC is not a
party to GATT. Intellectually, this argument carries some force. Realistically, however, it does not suffice to alleviate the United States'
concern that other nations would construe any such bilateral FTA
negotiations as a lack of commitment to the Uruguay Round.
For these reasons, I believe that near-term prospects for an FTA
between the ROC and the United States are dim, if not hopeless.
Although longer-term prospects for such an agreement are more difficult to assess, they too are doubtful. Nevertheless, several situations
could arise which may lead the United States to give greater consideration to such an agreement in the future.
First, the Uruguay Round could fail. If it does, the United States
may view FTAs with other countries (or combinations of countries)
as a "second-best" way to remove impediments to free trade. Because
the ROC has expressed interest in exploring FTA possibilities with
the United States, it is possible that the ROC could then find itself on
the list of potential United States negotiating partners. Alternatively,
if other nations begin seriously to consider FTAs with the ROC, this
would significantly increase the potential attractiveness of a United
5.

Mexico is an exception.
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States-ROC FTA. In that event, the United States would have an
incentive to enter into an FTA in order to avoid being placed at a
competitive disadvantage in its trade with the ROC. As noted earlier,
given the height of current ROC tariffs, an FTA is likely to cause
trade diversion to the ROC's FTA partner and away from other current exporters to the ROC. Further, if other nations were first to initiate FTA discussions with the ROC, this perhaps might reduce the
danger of an adverse reaction from the PRC government toward the
United States. I do not believe, however, that either the complete
failure of the Uruguay Round or serious efforts by major trading nations to negotiate FTAs with the ROC are likely.
Second, the United States may also take a greater interest in
FTA negotiations with the ROC in response to the developments unfolding in Europe as the European Community ("EC") moves toward
a single market in 1992. If the United States perceives that the single
market process will produce a "Fortress Europe," it may seek to create a trading bloc of its own. If so, Asia is one of the most likely
places where the United States will find potential members for such a
rival trading group. In fact, the actual existence of a "Fortress Europe" with increased formal barriers to trade into the Community
might not be a prerequisite to such a scenario. There has already been
much discussion in the United States about the need for increased
protectionism to counter the developments in the EC, including the
widening circle of countries seeking assimilation or at least association
with this broad, rich market. It is not just fear of European protectionism, but also fear of a nascent economic juggernaut occupying the
European "economic space," that fuels calls for a United States-centered trade bloc. Developments in Europe to date do not provide
much basis for predicting increased formal barriers to most trade into
the EC, but even unfounded fears can cause nations to initiate what
they view as defensive measures. Whatever the United States response to events in Europe, a response that I still expect on balance to
be quite positive and supportive, a United States-ROC FTA would be
improbable. If friction between the United States and the EC increases, the probability of any FTA involving the United States will
increase marginally, but for reasons given above, an agreement with
the ROC would remain a quite remote possibility.
Finally, changes in the political relationship between the United
States and the PRC, or between the PRC and the ROC, would significantly alter the United States' assessment of the political costs and
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benefits of an FTA with the ROC. It is unlikely that developments in
the PRC will cause relations between the United States and the PRC
to deteriorate to the point that the United States becomes relatively
unconcerned about the potential negative political fallout that would
result from an FTA with the ROC. As indicated earlier, this is an
unlikely scenario and would certainly require a change in the United
States' attitude toward the PRC and the ROC. Alternatively, and
more optimistically, the PRC may come to believe that an FTA between the United States and the ROC would serve its own interests.
This might be the case if the FTA were formulated in such a way as to
confer substantial economic advantages on the PRC, or if the relationship between the ROC and the PRC changes in such a way that
the PRC no longer objects to official ties between the United States
and the ROC. These scenarios, as well, are unlikely at the moment.
In light of recent events in Eastern Europe and in the PRC itself,
however, I hesitate to be bold in my predictions. As these events reveal, dramatic political changes can take place quickly, and even the
best informed observers are often caught off guard.
PAST FTAs INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO THE ROC

Accordingly, we cannot completely disregard the possibility that
unknown future developments could remove substantial foreign policy obstacles to a United States-ROC FTA. Even if this were to happen, other substantial obstacles to such an agreement would still
remain. The FTAs that the United States has entered into with Canada and Israel should not mislead anyone into thinking otherwise.
Special factors made agreements with Israel and Canada possible, and
these cannot be generalized.
In the case of Israel, the special factors were essentially political.
Over the past two decades, the United States has sought to bolster
Israel's economic viability by providing extraordinary amounts of financial aid in various forms. On many occasions, the United States
also has sought to give that nation symbolic assurance that it has special status in the United States' eyes. The FTA with Israel was intended to promote both of these objectives. Moreover, from the
United States' standpoint, the economic significance of the agreement
was, at most, modest. As explained below, this reduces opposition to
such FTAs.
In the case of Canada, the economic consequences of the agree-

Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.J[

[Vol. 13:1

ment will be considerable. However, the United States and Canada
have always been the closest of neighbors in every sense of the wordgeographically, linguistically, culturally, and economically. The FTA
was intended further to integrate the economies of the two countries,
recognizing that the integration process was substantially complete
even before the agreement. The economic and political circumstances
that formed the bases for the Israel and Canada FTAs were, therefore, quite different from those pertaining to the case of the ROC.
While the Canada FTA might be expanded into a North American
FTA, encompassing Mexico as well, extension of that framework to
other nations is problematic. Even if the United States were prepared
to move forward with FTAs in less exceptional circumstances, an
FTA with the ROC still seems improbable for several reasons beyond
the patent political issues addressed above.
First, FTA negotiations between the United States and the ROC
(or any other major trading nation) would generate enormous opposition, both domestically and abroad. Certain domestic industries
would benefit from such an agreement, but many others would be
seriously threatened by a United States-ROC FTA. For example, the
textile and steel industries have substantial political influence which
they have used successfully and repeatedly to secure protection
against imports. These industries would almost certainly react forcefully to even a hint that the United States was contemplating a comprehensive FTA with the ROC. Given the vague, yet widespread,
belief in the United States that Asian countries are export "machines"
with which United States business cannot successfully compete, it
would be surprising if the pleas of these and other threatened industries went unheeded. In addition, even without considering potential
PRC objections, discussion of an FTA with the ROC would likely
generate opposition from many of the United States' other Asian trading partners, unless the United States was willing to conclude FTAs
with those countries as well. The latter scenario, of course, while diminishing foreign opposition would increase domestic resistance.
At the same time, the forces in support of an FTA with the ROC
would be relatively limited. The ROC's home market, while growing
at an astounding rate, is still widely viewed as small and offering only
limited opportunity for United States exports. The possibility that an
FTA with the ROC might create new opportunities for United States
business investments, as well as the possible use of the ROC as a base
for other activities in the region, might appeal to some United States
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business interests. But it is difficult to visualize these interests coalescing to form a formidable force in support of an ROC FTA. United
States agricultural producers probably would perceive an open ROC
market as a significant new opportunity. However, compared to most
other Asian countries, the ROC is already relatively open to United
States agricultural exports. Accordingly, the practical potential for
additional agricultural exports might be limited.
Finally, the appeal to the United States of an FTA with the ROC
might be dampened by the belief that the United States can achieve
increased exports to, and investment in, the ROC without yielding the
concessions that such an agreement would necessarily require. The
ROC has been rapidly opening its domestic market even without such
agreements. Furthermore, the ROC may be uniquely vulnerable to
unilateral pressure by the United States aimed at securing trade concessions, because the ROC is politically isolated and dependent upon
the United States for protection of its security interests. However unfortunate it may be from the ROC's perspective, the United States'
desire for greater access to ROC markets is much more likely to be
embodied in political pressure on the ROC than in support for a
United States-ROC FTA.

An Initial Perspective on the United
States-Republic of China Free Trade
Agreement
DOUGLAS

T. HUNG*

The Republic of China ("ROC") greatly values its long-lasting,
cordial relationship with the United States. In particular, the two
countries enjoy a mutually beneficial commercial relationship based
upon earnest trust and goodwill.
For several years, the ROC has been contemplating various ways
to improve bilateral trade relations with the United States, its major
and most important trading partner. For instance, the ROC has been
exploring ways to protect this trade relationship from the impact of
political swings in both countries. The ROC recognizes the need for a
* Director, General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China, Liaison Office,
San Francisco, California.

